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Abstract. Current life is a complex, multi-level phenomenon
that is so diverse in its manifestations that a short and ex-
haustive definition of life is hardly possible. The high com-
plexity of life, as well as a poor understanding of what life
is in essence, are the obstacles to the elaboration of such a
definition. Important characteristics of life, such as whole
system-, ecosystem-, and information-defined characteris-
tics, have been included in the definition of life only recently.
Ecosystem-defined characteristics have been absent in mod-
els of the pre-biotic state for a long time. However, with-
out an ecosystem context, the concept of the emergence of
life cannot be complete. Interconnections between living and
non-living components of a primordial evolving system are
decisive for the period of transition from chemical to biolog-
ical evolution.
Information-defined characteristics of life are often re-
duced to storage and the expression of genetic information,
yet the operation of such perfect processes in prebiotic and
transitional systems is unlikely. Genetic information, as de-
fined in terms of the Shannon theory of communication, rep-
resents only a certain “informational channel” specified with
respect to the expression of the structural genes. However,
recent findings concerning the molecular mechanisms of the
differential regulation of gene activity, and in the genomics,
postgenomics and proteomics control mechanisms, suppose
a richer diversity of informational flows in the organism.
Moreover, considering life in a more general context, other
types of related, informational channels, in particular, regard-
ing the differentiation of higher taxa, hiatus, and expansion
processes, should be kept in mind.
In many publications devoted to the origin of life, the
terms “living”, “life”, and “living organism” are freely in-
terchanged which proves the vagueness of insights about the
different levels of the living system.
Correspondence to: Y. N. Zhuravlev
(zhuravlev@ibss.dvo.ru)
This report considers some variants of the definition of life
that have been recently suggested and are based on present-
day knowledge of the structures and functions of life. The
contradictory demands of a definition, which needs to be
complete and short at the same time, are emphasized. A defi-
nition characterizing life as a state, a structure, and a process,
is proposed.
1 Introduction
Our insight into the present-day reality is circumscribed and
fragmentary. It is rather a complicated goal to define even a
familiar event or phenomenon, and the phenomenon of life is
especially pertinent in this respect. A large number of defi-
nitions of life have been proposed (about 80 short definitions
were presented in the proceedings of the International Work-
shop on Life, Pa´lyi et al., 2002), some of them being con-
troversial and none was in common use. Nevertheless, such
attempts are not meaningless, since in trying to define the
object we obtain more and more comprehensive illumination
of the problem and can continue such attempts as long as the
phenomenon is revealed. However, in defining life, many au-
thors find this point unreachable and even Bohr (1933) sup-
posed that “the existence of life must be considered as an el-
ementary fact (or axiom) that cannot be explained, but must
be taken as a starting point in biology”. Similar problems
arise when we try to reconstruct the processes that resulted
in the emergence of life. The reconstructions are more diffi-
cult since the events leading up to the origin of life are remote
from us by a time interval of about 4 billions years and are
not preserved in the early geological record.
It seems unlikely that by combining two abstruse problems
(the definition of recent life and the reconstruction of its ori-
gin) we can cast additional light on either of them. However,
these two terms (the definition of life and the origin of life)
can serve as a mutual test for the validity of hypotheses in
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Table 1. Different notions of life emergence and their scenarios.
Notion or belief Scenario
- Life is eternal - No
- Life is created by God - Hexaemeron or similar
- Life emerged via evolution - Reconstruction of a
from preexisting more transition from chemical
simple organic matter to biological evolution
- Life invaded from space - Any of three above
(panspermia)
both fields, and, on the other hand, different scenarios for the
emergence of life can be proposed depending on the core at-
tributes of life chosen for its definition. The latter becomes
especially evident when different notions of the emergence
of life are summarized in Table 1. The two first lines of the
table present beliefs which need no scientific reconstructions,
the fourth one drives us back to the three possibilities men-
tioned above, and only the third notion is based on the idea
of scientific reconstruction.
The third scenario (Table 1) is presented in a general form.
The “metabolism first” scenario can be subdivided into the
“prebiotic soup” (Oparin, 1924; Haldane, 1929), the “surface
metabolism” (Wa¨chtershauser, 1988) hypotheses, and other
variants of the chemoorganotrophic concept (for references,
see Wa¨chtershauser, 1988). Similarly, the “two polymers”
scenario includes “the gene-first” (Gilbert, 1986; see also
more recent references in Santos et al., 2003), as well as “the
replication-first” scenario comprising the hypercycle and its
stochastic versions (Eigen and Schuster, 1979; Eigen et al.,
1981; Szathma´ry and Demeter, 1987). Among these con-
cepts, the RNA-world is the most accepted (Gilbert, 1986;
Gesteland et al., 1999), although it is also criticized (Orgel,
2003). The Lipid-world (Segre et al., 2001) is a less popular
scenario of pre-life, nevertheless it should also be mentioned
here.
We have insufficient scientific evidence to prefer any of
these scenarios. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that some of
the scenarios were not implemented in concert. However, al-
most every author believes that his idea based upon personal
knowledge, experience, and persuasions, is more fundamen-
tal than others. In addition to these personal preferences,
some objective circumstances influence the content and sense
of the definition. For example, an observer on Earth will dis-
cover such attributes of life as the diversity of species in na-
ture and diversity of domesticated forms, competition and
synergism of species; these observations impelled Darwin
(1872) to put forward the ideas of speciation and evolution.
On the contrary, the above listed important attributes are in-
discernible for an observer positioned outside the Earth, and
he will define life as a process of current expansion by energy
and matter sources from the surroundings.
In this paper, we consider the life coming-to-be as a transi-
tion from chemical evolution to a biological one. Such insep-
arable attributes of life as the transformation of energy and
matter were inherited by life from the preceding stages of
the Earth’s development, whereas complexity, active adapta-
tion, and multi-level hierarchy were established directly dur-
ing the transition period. In general, the transition period
should have been rather short, but extremely rich in events,
resulting in the life’s intrinsic characteristics.
2 Historical variations of the definition of life
There is a set of claims which any definition has to satisfy,
and this general problem has been discussed in detail else-
where (Emmeche, 1998; Cleland and Chyba, 2002; Ruiz-
Mirazo et al., 2004). According to these authors the defini-
tion should:
(a) be fully coherent with current knowledge in biology,
chemistry and physics;
(b) avoid redundancies and be self-consistent;
(c) possess conceptual elegance and deep explanatory
power (i.e. it must provide a better understanding of the na-
ture of life, guiding our search into its origins and its subse-
quent maintenance and development);
(d) be universal (in the sense that it must discriminate the
necessary from the contingent features of life, selecting just
the former);
(e) be minimal but specific enough (i.e. it should include
just those elements that are common to all forms of life – not
being, in principle, restricted to life on Earth – and, at the
same time, it must put forward a clear operational criterion
to tell the living from the inert, clarifying border-line cases,
contributing to determine biomarkers, etc.).
One can notice that multi-sided requirements accumulated
in these five items are very advisable, yet hardly achiev-
able in the framework of one elegant concept. For example,
Koshland’s (2002) “seven pillars” proposal is rather elegant.
Yet, when extrapolated to primordial life, the “pillars” suffers
from differential rescaling that destroys the whole building.
Indeed, it seems unlikely that properties of “compartmen-
talization, program and seclusion” are the features of non-
differentiated primary life. So elegance is, most likely, a
satellite of the incompleteness or uncertainty of definition,
rather than of its deep explanatory power.
The majority of definitions of life (see, for instance, the
definitions from Pa´lyi et al., 2002) cannot satisfy thoroughly
the demands of items c) and e), because they deal with only
a few attributes of life. As an expressive example, the ex-
tremely short definition “Living thing makes models, and
nonliving do not” given by Patten et al. (1997) can be cited.
It certainly looks rather elegant and ingenious. However, the
term “model” can be freely interpreted, so one could say:
“My son never made models, is he alive? What nonsense!”.
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Table 2. Comparison of life’s attributes postulated by different authors and the relationship of these attributes to primordial life.
Ecosystem principle “Pillars of life” Their possible counter
by Patten et al. (1997) by Koshland (2002) partner in primordial life
1 Conservation Energy Retention time for energy of excitement
2 Dissipation ? Dissipation
3 Openness ? Openness
4 Growth ? Irreversible growth
5 Constraint Initial conditions
6 Differentiation ? Start of irreversible differentiation
7 Adaptation Adaptability Adaptation
8 Coherence ?
9 ? Regeneration Self-recruitment
10 Program, Seclusion,
Improvisation,
Compartmentalization
Widely accepted definitions are also vulnerable. The so-
called Darwinian definition goes as follows: “Life is a system
capable of evolution by natural selection” (Sagan, 1970); this
restricted by only two attributes of life and, consequently, it
is unable to differentiate between a population and the life
as a global phenomenon. More detailed specification of the
Darwinian definition by a supplement “self-sustained chem-
ical system” (Joyce, 1994) does not radically affect the dis-
criminating capacity of the definition, because it is hardly
possible to specify life, including early life, before the emer-
gence of the replication machinery (for a review, see Santos
et al., 2003).
One could say that the Darwinian definition produces a cri-
terion for the emergence of life because it directly connects
the origin of life with the beginning of evolution. That crite-
rion also is not universal since the manifestation of evolution
may be “fuzzy”. A practical example demonstrating the re-
stricted validity of the definition is the hypothesized extrater-
restrial life: How long should we wait for the evidence of its
evolution (Fleischaker, 1990)?
Any phenomenon can be defined only within the frame-
work of our knowledge of its nature. Cleland and Chyba
(2002) have illustrated this thesis with an example of the def-
inition of water before and after knowledge on the chemical
structure of molecule of water. “Water is H2O” – was their
final definition separating water from other substances. In as
much as water is only a substance, this definition revealing
its structure can be accepted as sufficient. However, life is
not a simple substance nor a matter body only. It manifests
itself as a process or as a system of very complex hierarchi-
cal structures with specific dynamics, diversity of functions,
and interrelations with their surroundings (Simon, 2004; Pri-
gogine, 1997, 1999; Vernadsky, 2003).
These manifestations of life are elucidated in literature
more or less completely. An historical review of the defini-
tions of life shows that there has been a gradual inclusion of
new scientific achievements in the understanding of life. At
the turn of the 20th century, dialectical materialism professed
that life is a form of the existence of protein bodies sup-
porting themselves by an exchange of matter with their sur-
roundings (our translation from German: “Leben ist die Da-
seinsweise der Eiweißko¨rper und diese Daseinsweise besteht
wesentlich in der besta¨ndigen Erneuerung ihrer chemischen
Bestandteile durch Erna¨hrung und Ausscheidung...” Engels,
1948, p. 256). For the sake of the goal of this section, we will
concentrate on the term “protein body”. Initially, it means
“the organism”, with the additional characteristic of its “pro-
toplasmic” content. After discovering the leading role of
DNA in heredity, there were attempts to improve this defini-
tion by substituting the term “protein body” by “DNA body”.
After the formulation of the RNA-world idea, this definition
came into disuse. Nevertheless, it keeps its value for a histor-
ical analysis, demonstrating how new knowledge can change
the content of the definition of the familiar object.
Life subsystems, such as populations and communities,
are included in ecosystems composing the Earth’s biosphere
(Vernadsky, 2003). Ecosystems, however, include life in its
interconnections with its surroundings; and for some ecosys-
tems, their surroundings may be in part alive, namely these
interconnections play an important role in our notion that life
is inseparable from its environment. This consideration is
important both for the definition of life and for the early re-
construction of life. One can state that the life has emerged
and continues to exist as an ecosystem.
The ecosystem-defined aspect of current life was ac-
tively studied over the last decades in many laboratories.
Among others, the works by Jørgensen (1999) and Ulanow-
icz (2003) with their colleges (Jørgensen et al., 2000; Nielsen
and Ulanowicz, 2000) have to be mentioned first of all.
Based on these works, the authors identify the main ecosys-
tem attributes. They are: conservation (of energy, matter
and information), dissipation, openness, growth, constraint,
www.biogeosciences.net/3/281/2006/ Biogeosciences, 3, 281–291, 2006
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differentiation, adaptation, coherence (Patten et al., 1997).
The authors believe that all eight characteristics are insepa-
rable for ecosystem operation, however, if some properties
are lacking, they can be modified or added later on.
It is of interest to compare these eight basic characteris-
tics with the seven “pillars of life” by Koshland (2002), who
listed the main principles for current life (program, impro-
visation, compartmentalization, energy, regeneration, adapt-
ability, and seclusion). We arranged the comparison in Ta-
ble 2.
One can see that there is only a limited coincidence be-
tween these two lists of life’s attributes, and coincidences re-
late mainly to conservation attributes (ecosystem traits) and
adaptability (life and life subsystems [organism, population]
traits). However, such attributes as growth, openness and dis-
sipation are also inseparable characteristics of life, includ-
ing the primordial emerging life, yet they are absent from
Koshland’s list. The discrepancies in the data in Table 2
seem to be a consequence of the different approaches used:
the system approach by Patten et al. (1997) and the struc-
tural one by Koshland (2002). At the same time, the choice
of life attributes was arbitrary and incomplete in both cases.
That reflects the absence of a general consensus as to what
attributes of life are really unique and inseparable from life
itself. Kompanichenko (2004) had recently calculated that
from 230 characteristics of life which were cited in 78 defi-
nitions of life in the “Fundamentals of Life” volume (Pa´lyi,
2002), only 19 were in common use. Even in such a case,
it seems impossible to include all these characteristics into a
short definition of life, but the systemic approach can sim-
plify this task.
3 Basic terms for life definition and the hierarchy of
manifestations of life
In publications devoted to the emergence of life, we find
many examples of arbitrary manipulations with the terms de-
noting different levels of the life organization. “Living mat-
ter”, “organism”, “the living” and “life” are often used as
equivalents. For example, “life is an emergent attribute of a
system whose components assemble an organism” (Zavarsin,
2004, p. 814). From the holistic viewpoint, such a permuta-
tion is vulnerable, since it equivalates the emergence of life
with the organism level of complexity, whereas life is of-
ten defined as the collective feature of organisms (Kauffman,
1993, 2000).
“Living matter” is the only equivalent of “life”. It seems
reasonable to use this term in a context where life intercon-
nects with surrounding “inert matter”. The usage of “living
matter” in the sense of a part of an organism is more dis-
putable, since it is very difficult to recognize whether this part
is really alive or not. “Organism” and “life” are not equiva-
lents, since any individual organism is only a part of life as
a system. An “organism” per se is unable to exist for a long
time, but it forms part of life as a whole.
Any single organism is only a fragment of the life sub-
system, namely, a population which presents a set of related
organisms and determines the response of this set to the ex-
ternal effects. “A population”, in its turn, is only a part of the
life system (or a part of the living moiety of an ecosystem,
or a part of a community) since no population alone, isolated
from others, can be considered as a natural ecosystem unit.
Regarding the term biota (combined flora and fauna of a re-
gion), Kirby (2002) indicated that “biota” has more a general
sense than “organism”, but yet not so all-embracing as “bio-
logical system”, which may include an environment as well.
The term biological system, considered in relationship with
its environment, can be legitimately considered as a part of
an ecosystem.
The term “system” was introduced very early into the def-
initions of life (see review in Smith, 1986), yet the conceptu-
alization of life as a system is, to date, rather far from com-
pleteness. This process was initiated in the middle of the 20th
century with the well-known publications of Schro¨dinger
(1945), Bertalanffy (1952), Wiener (1948) and others (for a
detailed review see Prigogine, 1997, 1999) to cover an obvi-
ous gap between systems obeying the thermodynamic laws
and living systems.
Many “thermodynamic” definitions of life have appeared
since then. Some of them relate to the origin of life as well.
Thus, Schneider and Kay (1994) stated that “life emerges be-
cause thermodynamics mandates order from disorder when-
ever thermodynamic gradients and environmental conditions
exist” (p. 171).
Another attempt was reviewed by Luisi (1998), who gave
a definition where the term “evolution”, as a basic of Dar-
winism, was not used:
“Life is: A system which is self-sustaining by utilizing ex-
ternal energy/nutrients owing to its internal process of com-
ponent production and coupled to the medium via adaptive
changes which persist during the time history of the system”.
It is of great importance that life is defined here as a self-
sustaining system; it is more correct than self-reproducible
systems, since self-reproducible systems are only the sub-
systems of life, its agents. Nevertheless, one can notice
that, although this and other important attributes of life such
as adaptability and utilization of external energy and matter
(characteristics of open system) are included, the structure
characteristics of life are almost completely lacking in this
definition.
The idea of network structure of life’s system was devel-
oped hereafter in the paper of Ruiz-Mirazo et al. (2004), who
stated that:
“’life’ – in the broad sense of the term – is a complex
collective network made out of self-reproducing autonomous
agents whose basic organization is instructed by material
records generated through the evolutionary-historical pro-
cess of that collective network”.
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Fig. 1. The transmission of genetic message from the DNA to the protein tape using a transmission channel that is embodied in the gene
expression machinery (adopted from Yockey, 2000).
There are two important terms in this definition. The first
one, namely instruction for basic organization, introduces
the informational context into the definition. The second
term, e.g. evolutionary-historical process, expands our con-
sideration beyond the Darwinian evolution which is usually
mentioned as the species oriented evolution (Darwin, 1872;
for comments see Erwin, 2000). The development of these
important aspects are eagerly anticipated for their contribu-
tions in both the recognition of life, in its essence, and the
definition of life.
A new trend called the “minimal cell” was initiated in the
last decades starting from the works of Varela et al. (1974),
Woese (1983), Morowitz (1992) and others (for a review,
see Islas, 2004). They try to define a minimal set of genes
that can represent the key attributes of life. A minimal set
of the protein-encoding genes was shown to be extremely
small: a mutant strain of Mycoplasma genitalium with 265
to 350 genes can grow and divide under laboratory condi-
tions (Hutchinson et al., 1999). This value is about an or-
der of magnitude lower than the number of enzymes (2000)
proposed for the simplest organism about two decades ago
(Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, 1978). However, extrapolation
of these results to the early evolution of life is rather diffi-
cult, since such wild species and their mutants are parasitic
species and can exist only under highly favourable condi-
tions. Moreover, those examples represent the reduced vari-
ants of organisms living for a long time, so this reduction
needs the conditions of operation of the genetic apparatus
based on the DNA/RNA/Protein chain of information trans-
fer. Emergence of this apparatus per se is one of the core
problems of early life.
4 “Biological information”, “goal-seeking behavior”
. . . , what else?
“...it is absolutely inconceivable to think of the history and
major achievements in 20th century biology without the con-
cept of information. In molecular biology one has replica-
tion, proofreading, messengers, editing, etc.” (Szathma´ry,
2001). Nevertheless, most of a recent models dealing with
the informational aspects of life were based on Shannon’s
theory of communication (Shannon, 1948), as well as on in-
formation transfer restricted by gene expression. Perhaps the
linear character of the gene expression process was a reason
why many authors restrict their information quest to canonic
informational pathways (see as examples and for references
Yockey, 2000; Szathma´ry, 2001).
The expression of genetic information includes a tran-
scription of mRNA on a DNA template and the subsequent
use of this RNA to govern the synthesis of protein molecule.
During transcription/translation events, the linear sequence
of DNA nucleotides converts into the amino acid sequence
of protein molecule. Thus, transmission of the genetic mes-
sage is restricted to rewriting the DNA tape information into
protein tape information (Yockey, 2000, Fig. 1).
Such a scenario, or similar scenarios can be found in
many papers illustrating the applications of information the-
ory in biology. The scheme seems to be elegant (see de-
mand c) of Ruiz-Mirazo et al. (2004), see Sect. 3 of this pa-
per). However, what is noticeable is the surprisingly small
value of information of living organisms. Yockey (2000)
calculated that an information content of 2000 enzymes car-
ried by one protobiont (the simplest organism of Hoyle and
www.biogeosciences.net/3/281/2006/ Biogeosciences, 3, 281–291, 2006
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Wickramasinghe, 1978) amounted to 935 000 bytes. Olson
(1995) calculated that the development of a human being is
governed by 750 MB of information. Both numbers seem to
be incredibly low in comparison with the elementary com-
puter programs we use daily. The cause is to be sought in
the nature of the very informational channel and communi-
cation itself. In Fig. 1, communication can be compared with
a list of samples from some collections proposed, say, for ex-
hibition. Thus, four pictures of a great painter and four pic-
tures in their frames will be coded by an equal numbers of
bits. Moreover, for a non-pre-instructed receiver, both com-
munications contain very limited information about the sub-
jects coded. If the receiver is pre-instructed, an additional
and supposedly rather significant information value has to be
considered. This information partly pre-exists in the system
and is partly generated during the decoding process. De-
coding starts from the point of identification of an amino
acid residue (AA) itself and its position in the protein tape
and in relation to its close (molecular, atomic) surroundings.
The information content of the latter kind was investigated in
the example of protein structure (see, for instance, Nekrasov,
2002, and references therein). There is a great difference be-
tween communicatory and decoding mechanisms. The for-
mer has nothing to do with the information indicating that
this particular AA, for example, arginine, is rather infrequent
in natural proteins, and that it possesses a guanidine group
and hereafter can participate in different molecular connec-
tions, especially with nucleic acids, etc.
The measure of information, that could be extracted from
a given symbolic communication, depends on the decoder
capability. Although the structures of sender and receiver
are absent from Fig. 1, we must emphasize that the whole
code supporting machinery is very complex, even much more
complex than a structure of channels for the genetic message
in this example. This machinery could not be reduced to ge-
netic noise because, in many cases, the organism as a whole
can be regarded as a decoder. Emergence of that machinery
is a prerequisite of the expression of genetic information, as
well as a linear genetic informational carrier. One can con-
clude that the linear information carriers have had little to do
with the evolutionary transition state, since they could appear
only during the later stages in the evolution of life.
It is an opportune moment to quantify the term “message”.
The equation for the measure of information that appears in
Shannon (1948) is:
H = −K
∑
i
pi · logpi , (1)
where pi is the probability of the i−th member of the al-
phabet. According to Shannon’s explanation, K is a positive
constant that “merely amounts to a choice of a unit of mea-
sure”. K has no physical dimensions and when the logarithm
is taken to the base 2 and K=1, H is measured in bits. The
informational content of Shannon’s communication is small
because it is the information of coding symbols and only the
symbols per se. This is a central affirmation of Shannon’s
information theory.
Information measured by this Eq. (1) does not mean
knowledge, it is a mere message composed of a sequence
of symbols. In the case of genetic information these sym-
bols are nucleotides and their combinations. However, the
Shannon measure of information is still a unique basis of
a broad variety of informational aspects related to biologi-
cal systems, in particular, “knowledge” aspects, “symbolic”
aspects, “goal-seeking behavior” (Chernavskii, 2000; Lom-
bardi, 2004).
The expression given in Eq. (1) is very similar to that of
entropy in statistical mechanics; for this reason the informa-
tion was often considered as negative entropy. In the words
of Corning (2002): “Negative entropy means, literally, an
absence of an absence of thermodynamic order...”. Informa-
tion as an elusive quantity resists definition, although we can
determine this quantity and many researchers readily restrict
themselves in their search of information to the example of
the genetic code. “We are not equipped to attempt any seri-
ous navigation of these deep waters”, said Patten et al. (1997,
p. 234) in a similar situation related to the information con-
tent of ecosystem.
We argue also that triplet-amino acid conversion is not
the only informational structure with which genetic informa-
tion operates. For example, the differential activity of genes
which underplayed all development programs is determined
by the synthesis of some small proteins, known as transcrip-
tion factors (Fig. 2; for new data on these poly-functional
proteins see Rebay et al., 2005). These molecules interact
with specific sites on DNA to open a number of informa-
tional channels similar to those schematized in Fig. 1. The
number of channels can be very large, supposedly, equal to
the number of structural genes in DNA; for example, about
of 3×104 genes in man (Claverie, 2001). Many other ways
of controlling information (splicing and alternative splicing,
RNA editing, post-transcriptional and post-translation gene
silencing and so forth) operate in living organisms, also.
In plants, for example, some significant processes of dif-
ferentiation started from the synthesis of some molecules of
endogenous growth regulators (phytohormones), e.g. auxin
(Woodward and Bartel, 2005). The interaction of an auxin
molecule with a receptor in a plasma membrane resulted in
the “acidic growth” of the cell wall and its surface expansion,
which, in turn, induced additional RNA and protein synthe-
sis, DNA duplication and so forth, to finish with the division
of a cell. Many small channels may be identified in this way
and many other information flows crossing and affecting this
one can be listed. The best illustration of the situation can be
found in the publications on gene nets (see Kolchanov and
Hofestaedt, 2004).
After considering the informational function of life as a
net of information flows in an organism, let us look at the
information exchange between organisms. It seems to be ob-
vious that the organisms exchange genetic information by the
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sexual process, horizontal gene transfer and other known pro-
cesses (Lynch, 2002; Arber, 2003; Shapiro, 2002), thus form-
ing the gene pool of populations. The evolutional trajectory
of certain genes is defined by natural selection, gene flow or
by more neutral processes, such as lineage sorting and others
(Avise, 2000; Sites and Marshall, 2003). How much infor-
mation remains unaccounted for in all of these cases?
There is one more important item we have to empha-
size in connection with “evolutionary-historical process that
generates material records”, according to Ruiz-Mirazo et
al. (2004). If this process relates to the evolution of life in
general, whereas “material records” are executed in agents
(as only the agents are material and then recordable), we ob-
tain one proclaimed example of an informational exchange
between life (sub)systems of different hierarchical levels. In-
deed, there is a dramatic gap in our knowledge of information
flows between ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels of life.
Such a connection, if it exists, might support the evolution of
higher taxa, as Gould (2002) hypothesized.
Thus, it is clear that the information flows in living systems
are not exhausted with gene expression information. More-
over, the information function of life is not exhausted by the
interconnection between subsystems and between different
levels of system hierarchy; however, to date, we have no ad-
equate measure of all these informational manifestations of
life. In this connection, the comment of one of our anony-
mous referee sounds very actually: “. . . the emergence of life
could be described as the need of material records (genes) as
a way to perpetuate self-maintaining dissipative structures.
However, great care has to be used in handling these ideas be-
cause genetic information and its biological meanings (ulti-
mately derived from translation) are intimately linked. More-
over, the inheritability of the information coded by genes (re-
sponsible for Darwinian evolution) should not be extended to
this additional content which is based on the existence of the
exchange of information between individual agents and may
be attributed to a property of the network rather than that of
the agents” (see BG Discussion, 2006, 3, 1–27, referee#1).
We quite agree that the informational aspect is one of the
most complex and ambiguous ones of all types of life. On
the one hand, it seems natural to describe the genetic order
in terms of “textual information”, and Shannon’s measure al-
lows one to evaluate this order. On the other hand, we do
clearly realize that living systems are ordered in many dif-
ferent manners, and one often has to create a measure of an
order drastically different from the genetic one. Of course,
if all types of orders could be reasonably represented as se-
quences of symbols, say, ones and zeros, Shannon’s measure
could probably become universally applicable for living sys-
tems, too. However, we often find it difficult to do so: it
is, for example, the case when we deal with the structural
complexity of living systems. We meet a yet more complex
case when some sort of a measure is required to evaluate
the dynamic complexity of a system, e.g. that of metabolic
networks. Use of Shannon’s measure is not always well-
grounded, although in some cases relevant measures can be
constructed using Shannon’s formula. On the whole, we do
not find any well-defined informational principle (Urstoff in
German) to be universally applicable for multifaceted con-
texts of biological order. Therefore, the informational con-
tent of life remains so far undefined, and it is a fact we have
to face quite independently of the threat it may or may not
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represent to the Darwinian paradigm. However, we certainly
agree that this subject is yet to be discussed, and we will be
happy if our paper could contribute to such a discussion.
We have to supplement also, that in living systems or in
a system imitating life, the information function results in
the creation of goal-seeking behavior. The goal (in this con-
text) has no measure, nevertheless, it was shown to be very
important on all levels of life hierarchy (Bendoricchio and
Jørgensen, 1997; Wilhelm and Bruggemann, 2000; Cher-
navskii, 2000).
Research on the goal function of life, on quantum informa-
tion theory (see Roy et al., 2002), is now in its early stages
and nobody knows how many new attributes of life will be
discovered in the future. In our attempts to define life, we are
always doomed to balance between incomplete knowledge
on the nature of life and our fervent desire to move forward
in this field.
5 One more definition of life and conclusion
The most important life manifestations can be combined into
three main groups that represent life as: i) a state, ii) a struc-
ture, and iii) a process. Consequently, a definition that re-
flects simultaneously the three-sided view of the life, seems
to be comprehensive. However, our knowledge of each of
these directions is accomplished to differing extents, and so,
such a definition will be neither elegant (as demanded by Em-
meche, 1998; Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2004) nor complete.
Moreover, it is rather difficult to separate one kind of life
manifestation from others. Life itself is indecomposable to
its constitutes: first of all, the structural and process charac-
teristics are so tightly associated that it seems impossible to
describe them in isolation. Nevertheless, we try to give an
explicit definition of life, consisting of three parts, to finish
with the relationship of this definition to the reconstruction
of events leading to the emergence of life:
i) Life, as we see it now, is a specific state of matter (the
living state) resulting from the interaction between matter
and energy carriers. This interaction starts from the utiliza-
tion of solar radiation by autotrophic organisms, and spreads
over a diversity of organisms via numerous (bio)chemical cy-
cles. A significant part of the utilized energy is retained in
organisms by molecular carriers and “network channels” of
high energy content; lessening of the utilized energy pool up
to some critical level entails in death.
ii) Life on Earth is represented by a specific hierarchi-
cal system (the living system) consisting of self-reproducing
agents. These agents are the only reference matter of life and
are often represented by organisms. They can sometimes be
represented as more complex units: bisexual pair, beehive,
etc. The agents being individuals can interact with each other
and therefore the whole system can be considered as a frag-
mented and integral entity simultaneously. Different levels
of the organization of agents correspond to different levels
of life hierarchy. Life as a system shows its worth in the di-
versity of constraints, feedbacks and interconnections with
surroundings.
iii) Life on Earth proceeds as the specific process (the liv-
ing process). It is expressed in transformations of surround-
ings (by agents) and in transmutations of the self-reproducing
agents themselves. From the physico-chemical point of view,
the living process has both dynamic and informational con-
tents. It allows the agents to properly meet the changes in
environment and to expand (spread) over a space, thus in-
creasing the level of system complexity and differentiation.
In our reconstruction of the emergence of life we have to
keep the three-sided view of life, as specified above. This re-
construction should start from finding such (molecular?) rep-
resentatives of the self-reproducing agents, which, being the
simplest ones, nevertheless, reserve the competence to create
the living state, the living system, and the living process.
The first part of this definition is devoted to the characteri-
zation of life as a state. We are afraid it is too far from being
as complete as the statement “Water is H2O”. The essence of
a “specific state” remains obscure, although we suspect that
this state is in some way connected with (and may be orig-
inated from) an excited state of organic molecules and their
ensembles. More detailed knowledge will be obtained from
investigations on macromolecular and supramolecular sys-
tems and related fields. Thus, we consider the physics and
chemistry of complex molecular systems as a more apt tool
to clarify the essence of a specific life state and the events
leading to its emergence in the transition period. However,
in the absence of experimental data we are obliged to restrict
this part of the definition by a description of some charac-
teristics we consider as important for understanding of this
state.
The second part of the definition characterizes life as a
hierarchical system while avoiding the detailed character-
istics of the sub-systems and their interrelationships. We
should clarify two important aspects of these interrelation-
ships. Firstly, most of known examples of hierarchy embrace
the rather long chains of subsystems, starting from genes and
the biochemical cycles inside the cell, and continuing with
the inner structures of the organism, as well as with com-
munities of organisms to compose the biosphere (McShea,
2001; Oltvai and Baraba´si (2002). The sub-systems along
this line are enclosed in each other, sometimes in a fractal
way. Secondly, the hierarchy is represented by a certain
(pyramidal or matrix) structure, where its elements reveal
both horizontal and vertical connections. The nature of these
connections on different levels of hierarchy remains obscure.
With respect to the third part we should emphasize that
such accepted attributes of life as the capacity to evolve is
not named here, however, it is implied in this part of the
definition, ensuing from the set of capabilities of the liv-
ing process and agents of life, which are listed in this para-
graph. The third part of the definition also reflects uncer-
tainties inherent in the question about the leading role of
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interconnections between “inert” surroundings and “active”
living matter. New molecular findings of gene duplication,
DNA rearrangement and DNA acquisition have proved the
active position of life in the evolution (Lynch, 2002; Arber,
2003; Shapiro, 2002). According to this knowledge, agents
of life are transmuted in such a way to produce a diversity
of genovariants among which the more fitted will be selected
during future changes in the environment. However, nobody
knows whether the environmental changes are accidental or
whether they follow a certain scenario, predetermining a di-
rection in the development of life.
The basic attributes of open systems – energy and matter
flows – are hidden in the expression “standing in the multi-
fold interconnections with surroundings”. We were forced
to limit ourselves in this field due to the existence of many
controversial opinions with regard to the first energy source
used by primordial life; each energy source presupposes a
unique way of transition from chemical to biological evolu-
tion. “The flow of energy through a system acts to organize
that system”, said Harold Morowitz (1968). There is a huge
body of literature on this topic which cannot be reviewed here
and a such review, if undertaken, will be unable to bring us
to broad acceptable conclusions.
Regrettably, the information essence of life is not dis-
played in our definition of life. This is a consequence of
the incompleted knowledge of the nature of information it-
self. “Different combinations of energy and matter arrayed
in space or sequenced in time give rise in the elusive quan-
tity, information” (Patten et al., 1997, p. 234). Moreover,
information theory at present reveals its structural complex-
ity; at least three concepts of information have been recently
formulated (Lombardi, 2004).
The third part of the definition shows that the splitting
(perhaps only in one’s mind) of events of the transition into
two moiety relating “agents” and “system” respectively, sim-
plifies the reconstruction of the transition state of evolution.
This is because certain life attributes, which appear with dif-
ficulty in agents, can easily emerge in the system.
Finally, it becomes more and more clear that the transition
period has to be short, but more saturated with the events that
were fundamental to the conversion of the non-living compo-
sitions into living systems.
In our work we do not compared our vision of life and
evolution with the other publications in this field (e.g. most
of contributors of OLEB proposed their own scenarios). Cer-
tainly, the definition proposed in this paper may be consid-
ered as a validity test for these scenarios. However, we have
wittingly tried to avoid such analysis, first of all because this
paper represents only a definitive part of our vision. To treat
the problem comprehensively, we are going to discuss this
question in our next publications, where we intend to con-
sider life as a structure, a state, and as a complex dynamic
process.
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